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Buyer Power and Innovation of Quality Products: 
Empirical Evidence from the German Food Sector
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Christoph R. Weiss and Antje Wittkopp 
 
Abstract: The last couple of decades have seen an increased retail concentration around 
the  world,  particularly  in  Europe.  Views  on  the  welfare  implications  of  this  severe 
change are controversial. Consumers might benefit because larger stores (owned by 
larger retailer chains) offer more product choices. On the other hand, there is concern 
that buyer power may force manufacturers “to reduce investment in new products or 
product improvements” 
[1]. 
This paper’s aim is to analyse whether retailer power affects food manufacturing firms 
incentives to invest in innovation of high quality food products. On the basis of a formal 
model,  we  find  that  retailer  market  power  reduces  upstream  firms  incentives  to 
introduce new products. This proposition is tested empirically on the basis of firm level 
data from a survey of food manufacturing firms carried out in 2002 in Germany. Results 
of multinomial logit model show a moderate and negative impact of retailer market 
power on innovation of regular quality products. No such negative impact is observed 
for  premium  quality  products.  Producers  of  premium  products  thus  seem  to  more 
effectively resist retailer market power in product innovation 
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1. Introduction 
 
The last couple of decades have seen an increased retail concentration around the world, 
particularly in Europe. In 1992, the top ten grocers in Europe accounted for 27.8 per 
cent of the market, but for 36.2 per cent only five years later
[2]. Views on the welfare 
implications of this severe change are controversial. Consumers might benefit because 
larger stores (owned by larger retailer chains) offer more product choices under more 
convenient conditions. Further, they could use their buying power to obtain lower prices 
from suppliers which could then be passed on to consumers. On the other hand, there is 
concern that powerful retailers might exert their market power in the product market 
and raise consumer prices. For example, Dobson and Waterson pointed out that a food 
basket in the highly concentrated UK food retailing costs 45%-points more than in the 
comparatively low concentrated U.S. food retailing
[3].  In addition, it has repeatedly 
been hypothesized that buyer power may force manufacturers “to reduce investment in 
new products or product improvements, advertising and brand building”
[1]. Similarly, a 
recent FTC report suggests that consumers “could be adversely affected by the exercise 
of buyer power in the long run, if prices to suppliers are reduced below the competitive 
level and if the suppliers respond by under-investing in innovation or production” 
[4].  
 
This paper aims at analysing whether buyer power affects upstream incentives to invest 
in product innovation. Special attention is given to the quality of product introduction. It 
is argued that vertically product differentiation provokes that prices and margins may 
not be stripped down that much 
[5,6], so that under-investment in premium products 
might  be  less  than  in  regular  quality  products.  Following,  the  question  if  retailers’ 
market power has a different impact on producers’ incentive to invest in superior quality 
products than in regular quality products is to be tested empirically.  
Particular emphasis will be given to the food sector for three reasons. Firstly, as Clarke 
et  al.  emphasize,  among  all  areas  of  retailing,  food  retailing  stands  out  to  have 
experienced the most significant changes in market structure during the last decades
[2]. 
Secondly, because of the size and importance of food retailing, these changes will have 
the greatest impact on consumers. Finally, the food sector is particularly interesting 
because of the large number of innovations per year. According to Madakom 32.478 
new products have been introduced into the German food market in year 2000
[7].  
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the relationship between buyer power 
and innovation incentives in a theoretical model in Section 2. Data and the empirical 
evidence is reported in Section 3. Section 4 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. The Model 
 
The impact of retailer power on the rate of product innovation in manufacturing can 
most easily  be investigated in a model based on Sullivan
[8]. The author develops a 
model of product innovation in a vertically related market by investigating separately 
the behaviour of retailers and manufacturers. In the following, we do not discuss the full 
model in detail but focus on retailers only and modify Sullivan’s model by introducing 
imperfect competition.  
We  assume  retailers  to  act  competitively  on  the  product  market  but  to  have 
monopsonistic  power  with  respect  to  input  markets  (manufacturers).  The  retailer’s 
problem is to decide how many new products to accept (X) from manufacturers and to 
determine the quantity of each product (q) and thus the total store quantity (Q = qX). In 
period t, the retailer decides to take Xt new products without knowing, whether or not 
this product will be successful in the market. If the product is successful, it can be sold 
for two periods, if it is not successful, it can only be sold in the first period but will not   4 
be accepted by consumers in the second period. The fraction of successful products, ρ, 
is treated as deterministic. In the following, we argue that premium products are more 
attractive to the consumer, hence premium quality increases the fraction of successful 
products. This was shown empirically by McNamara et al.
[9]. Thus,  ρ  increases with 
product quality.
2 The total number of products offered by a retailer in period t thus is, 
t t
T
t X X X + = −1 ρ  but only  ) ( ˆ
1 t t t X X X + = − ρ  are products attractive to consumers. If the 
retailer offers a large number of attractive products, consumers are willing to pay a 
higher price for products at a store. Formally, consumer demand is represented by the 
inverse demand function  ) ˆ (X P , with  0 ˆ >
X P  and  0 ˆ ˆ <
X X P , where 
X Pˆ  and 
X X P ˆ ˆ  represent the 
first and second derivative of  ) ˆ (X P , respectively.
3  
A  retailer  faces  two  sorts  of  costs:  operating  costs  K  and  costs  associated  with 
purchasing the product from the manufacturer W. Operating costs are increasing in the 
number  of  new  products  accepted  as  well  as  in  the  total  store  quantity: 
0 , 0 , 0 , 0 > > > > QQ XX Q X K K K K .
4 Due to monopsonistic market power, input prices are 
not given but vary with the quantity of products purchased:  0 > Q W .  
The retailers profit function for the two periods t and t+1 is: 
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Profit  maximisation  implies  choosing  X  and  Q  such  that  the  following  first  order 
conditions must be satisfied: 
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The following diagram illustrates this choice of X and Q in a steady state situation 
( 1 1, ˆ ˆ
+ + = = t t t t Q Q X X ).  
 
Diagram 1: The retailer’s optimal X and Q 
                                                 
2  Clearly, product quality has many different dimensions and cannot easily be captured and represented 
by a single parameter. Here we refer to “quality” as the consumers’ subjective satisfaction with the 
product purchased motivating him to buy the product again next period. Alternatively associating higher 
durability with higher quality clearly lead to the opposite result. 
3  Shopping  at  a  store  with  a  small  number  of  products  increases  the  chance  that  one  of the desired 
products is not available, in which case the consumer must either buy a less-than-optimal brand or visit 
another store. Offering a larger number of products may further satisfy consumer’s taste for variety. 
Thus PX > 0.  0 ˆ ˆ <
X X P  implies that the reduction in search costs from an additional product is declining 
in the number of products. Note that the probability that an additional product will be in the consumer’s 
optimal bundle is smaller when the number of products is large. Secondly, adding another product to a 
fixed amount of shelf space makes it more difficult for a consumer to find the product in the store (“in 
store search costs”). 
4  When  many new products are added to the store, it is  more difficult to rearrange the shelves and 
manage additional products, which implies KXX > 0.    5 
 
With respect to the total store quantity, the retailer will choose Q such that output price 
) ˆ (X P  equals total marginal costs. Total marginal costs include marginal operation costs 
KQ as well as marginal costs associated with purchasing products from manufacturers 
(WQQ + W(Q)). Similarly, the optimal number of products chosen is also determined by 
the intersection of marginal costs KX and marginal revenue ( ) ˆ ( 2 ˆ X QP
X ρ ). The marginal 
revenue curve is downward sloping since  0 ˆ ˆ <
X X P .  
Diagram 1 also allows to compare Q
* and X
* with a situation where the retailer does not 
have monopsonistic power (Q
C* and X
C*). In a competitive market, the marginal costs of 
total store quantity will be lower (since WQ = 0) which increases the optimal quantity 
(Q
C* > Q
*). An increase in Q shifts the marginal revenue curve in the second part of 
diagram 1, which again raises the optimal number of products (X
C* > X
*). This process 
is reinforced by the fact that an increase in X further raises the consumers willingness to 
pay ( ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( X P X P
C > ).  
Modelling the manufacturer’s behaviour does not add anything important to the model. 
We  can  conclude  that  retailer  market  power  reduces  the  demand  for  new  products 
compared to a competitive retailer market. The basic argument is that concentration 
among  buyers  leads  to  a  strategic  reduction  in  purchases  with  the  aim  of  reducing 
prices.  This  lowers  manufacturers  profits  and  reduces  incentives  for  product 
innovation.
5 Increasing unit costs are the primary source of buyer power in this model. 
Additional  arguments  supporting  a  relationship  between  buyer  power  and  suppliers 
profits and innovation have been suggested. Katz stresses that larger buyers can more 
credibly  threaten  to  integrate  backwards  thereby  exerting  more  pressure  on  a 
supplier
[11]. Scherer and Ross argue that a large buyer’s purchasing order is more likely 
to break up potential collusion between suppliers
[12]. Within the framework of bilateral 
negotiations between suppliers and downstream firms, Inderst and Wey consider a large 
buyer’s ability of threatening to withdraw his demand. If negotiations fails, suppliers 
with a fixed capacity in the short run will have difficulties in selling their output
[13]. 
Finally, market power of downstream firms might also allow them to force upstream 
firms  into  contractual  arrangements  such  as  signing  exclusive  supply  contracts. 
Stefanides has shown that these contracts will reduce upstream innovation in that the 
foreclosed  suppliers  incur  the  disadvantages  of  low-scale  production  and  are 
discouraged from innovating
[14].  
With respect to the impact of product quality ρ, one should distinguish two different 
effects. First, the incentive to innovate is higher for quality products. This can be seen in 
Diagram 1. An increase in ρ shifts the marginal revenue curve  ) ˆ ( 2 ˆ X QP
X ρ  to the top 
                                                 
5  For a recent summary of the empirical literature linking market concentration to buyer and supplier 
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right increasing the optimal number of new products. Given the costs of innovating, it is 
more attractive to do so if the product can be sold for two periods (high quality) as 
opposed to one period only.  
The second effect refers to the impact of retailer market power on innovation in food 
manufacturing.  Here,  the  results  from  the  theoretical  model  are  inconclusive  as  an 
increase in ρ would shift the marginal revenue curve in the monopsony as well as in the 
competitive  equilibrium.  Applying  the  implicit  function  theorem  to  equation  (2) 
suggests that these two effects exactly cancel out so that there is no difference in the 
importance of retailer market power for regular and high quality products. 
One might however speculate that product quality not only influences the consumers’ 
willingness to purchase products repeatedly but could also influence other parameters of 
the model. In particular, it seems plausible that high quality products might improve 
producers bargaining power towards retailers. Whether higher product quality actually 
mitigates the impact of retailer market power on innovation will be investigated in the 
next section.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Evidence 
 
For this purpose we conducted a survey among food industry firms in Germany in 
spring  2002.  Aim  was  to  consider  the  companies’  competitive  environment,  the 
determinants of product innovation activities and new product success. Special attention 
was given to the introduction of superior quality products.  
We  mailed  a  questionnaires  to  539  companies  in  food  manufacturing  listed  in  the 
„Presse-Taschenbuch Ernährung”, a handbook on food industry which is published by 
the  Federation  of  German  Food  and  Drink  Industries  (BVE) 
[15].  From  539 
questionnaires, 119 (22 %) were returned. For further analysis only 88 questionnaires 
could be used due to data restrictions. Dataset consists of companies of all sectors of 
food industry, federal states and size categories. The majority of respondents belong to 
meat  processing,  brewery  and  dairy  sector.  Least  companies  are  from  malthouse, 
condiments  or  coffee  and  tea  processing.  Most  of  the  respondents  are  small-  and 
medium-sized companies (63 firms, 71.59%), however firm size ranges from 3 persons 
employed  up  to  8500.  Thus,  sample  is  a  good  representation  of  the  German  food 
industry. 
 
As endogenous variable we use a dummy variable for innovation activity at different 
product quality levels (QP). QP can take the values 0, 1 and 2.  
 
   
= QP  
 
 
where NNP is the number of new or notedly improved products introduced in the period 
1999-2001 and TPREM is the extent of firm’s picking up the premium trend. TPREM 
was  reported  on  a  scale  from  1  (not  important)  to  5  (very  much  important).  Thus, 
dummy variable is set equal to 2 if the firm reported to have had innovative activity and 
stated a very high importance of picking up the premium trend (TPREM=5). If the firm 
has launched a product but evaluated the picking up of premium trend less than “very 
much important” (TPREM<5), dummy variable takes the value 1. If the firm has not 
launched an innovative product between 1999 and 2001 at all, dummy variable is set 
equal  to  zero.  Of  88  firms,  20  (22.73%)  reported  the  launch  of  new  products  with 
superior product quality, 54 firms (61.36%) with regular product quality and 14 firms 
(15.91%) did not show any innovative activity.  
0,   if NNP = 0 
1,   if NNP > 0   and  TPREM < 5 
2,   if NNP > 0   and  TPREM = 5   7 
The definition and descriptive statistics of all variables used is reported in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Definition and descriptive statistics of variables used (n = 88) 




Market  share  (MAS):  market  share  in  firm’s  main  pillar  in  year  2001 
measured on the following scale: (1) if the share is ≤1%; (2) if the share is 
between 1% and < 5%; (3) if the share is between 5% and < 10%; (4) if the 
share is between 10% and < 20%; (5) if the share is ≥20%.  
3.0795       
1.4160       
1 
5 
Export share (EXP): percentage of total sales in year 2001 generated from 
exports, in % 
9.6636       
11.7382      
0 
60 
R&D activity (RD): company’s share of total sales spent on average on 
research and development on the following scale: (0) if the share is 0%; (1) 
if the share is between > 0% and < 0.25%; (2) if the share is between 
0.25% and < 0.5%; (3) if the share is between 0.5% and < 0.75%; (4) if the 
share is between 0.75% and < 1%; (5) if the share is between 1% and < 
1.5%; (6) if the share is between 1.5% and < 2%; (7) if the share is  ≥ 2%.  
2.0795 
1.8707            
0 
7 
Brand strategy (BRANDS): evaluation of the importance of brand strategy 
in the company on a scale from 1 (unimportant) to 5 (very important). 
3.8295 
1.2431            
1 
5 
Dummy variable for retailer market power (RMP5). Respondents were 
asked to evaluate retailers’ market power on a scale from 1 (very low) to 5 
(very high). The dummy variable is set equal to 1 if the respondent 
characterizes retailer market power to be very high, and is set equal to zero 
otherwise 
0.4773 
0.5023            
0 
1 
Competitive intensity (COMP). Respondents were asked to rank the 
degree of competition in their own industry on a scale from 1 (very low) to 
5 (very high). 
3.2841 
0.7871            
2 
5 
Firm size (LABOR). Number of people employed  494.4545      
1117.4017      
3 
8500 
Adaptation  flexibility  (FLEX):  evaluation  of  the  company’s  adaptation 
flexibility on a scale from 1 (very low) to 5 (very high) 
3.4886 
0.9346            
2 
5 
Investment rate (INVEST): % share of total sales spent in year 2001 on 
investment 
5.8097       
6.9364       
0 
50 
Market size (SIZE): industry sales in real terms in billion EUR in year 
1999.* 
13.8442      
11.0904      
0.9469       
38.2765         
Market growth (GR): Average growth rate of industry real sales between 
1995 and 1999, in %. * 
1.2767       
6.4814      
-11.7983      
28.3127         
*   data source:  aggregated 4-digit data of production survey provided and published by German 
Federal Statistical Office, data for years 1995-1999. 
 
In  the  empirical  model  we  aim  at  explaining  the  firms’  decision  between  the  three 
alternatives:  no  innovation  (QP=0),  product  innovation  at  regular  product  quality 
(QP=1), and product innovation at superior product quality (QP=2).  We assume that 
firm  utility  ij U associated  with  alternative  j  ( 2 , 1 , 0 = j )  for  firm  i  is 
ij j ij j j ij Z X U ε ε β α + = + + =
' , where X is a matrix of firm and market characteristics,  j β  
is a vector of parameters and  ij ε are factors of disturbance. If the firm makes choice j in 
particular, we assume that  ij U is the maximum among the J utilities:  ) ( Pr ik ij U U ob >  for 
all other  j k ≠ . If the J disturbances  ij ε  are independent and identically distributed with 
Weibull distribution,  ) exp( ) (
ij e F ij
ε ε
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where  j p  is the sample proportion of observations that make choice j. 
6 The results of 
the multinomial logit model analysing the incentive to innovate at different product 
quality levels of 88 enterprises in German food industry in 2002 is reported in Table 2.  
 
Table 2:   Results of Multinomial Logit Model (n=88) 
Explanatory Variables  regular quality product  
(QP=1) 
premium quality product 
(QP=2) 
  Parameter  (t-Value)  Parameter  (t-Value) 
Constant  -7.8370 *  -1.698  -16.6954 ***  -3.030 
Market share MAS  1.8211 **  2.084  2.1543 **  2.356 
Export share EXP  -0.1553 ***  -2.602  -0.2020 ***  -2.860 
R&D activity RD   0.9352 *  1.920  1.1623 **  2.261 
Brand strategy BRANDS   0.7880  1.422  1.9919 ***  2.968 
retailer market power RMP5  -2.5581 *  -1.670  -2.0041  -1.195 
Competitive intensity COMP   -0.0087  -0.010  -0.1416  -0.152 
Firm size LABOR  0.0010  0.797  0.0013  0.998 
Adaptation flexibility FLEX   2.0744 *  1.919  2.8977 **  2.545 
Investment rate INVEST  -0.1092  -1.588  -0.2150 **  -2.031 
Market size SIZE  -0.1288 *  -1.897  -0.2046 ***  -2.630 
Market growth GR  -0.1105  -0.672  -0.1103  -0.652 
Log likelihood function         -44.6138      
Restricted log likelihood (β=0)      -81.7391      
Likelihood ratio test (DF)                 74.2505 (22)   
   
Predicted       
Actual  0  1  2  Total   
0  10  4  0  14   
1  4  45  5  54   
2  1  9  10  20   
Total  15  58  15  88   
           
Remarks:  *** significance level = 1%; ** significance level = 5%; * significance level = 10%; DF 
refers to the degrees of freedom. Outcome QP=0 is the comparison group. 
 
As the likelihood ratio test reports, estimation model is statistically significant below the 
1%-level. The predictive power of the model is high: From the total number of 88 
observations 73.86% are correctly classified by the econometric model. In the three 
categories, 71.43% of the “zeros”, 83.33% of the “ones” and 50% of the “twos” are 
correctly  classified.  A  comparison  of  the  two  models  indicates  that  the  parameter 
estimates for the various variables are very similar. 
At sample means, probability to introduce a regular quality product is 87.90%, to launch 
a superior quality product is 11.60% and probability of no innovation is 0.05%. Thus, 
regular (premium) product quality is of major (minor) importance. 
 
Study’s main attention is to investigate the impact of German food retailers’ market 
power on innovation incentive. Therefore we asked interviewed companies to give an 
evaluation of the retailers’ market power on a scale from 1 (retailer market power is 
very low) to 5 (retailer market power is very high). Nearly half of the respondents 
(47.73 per cent) affirm that retailers’ market power is high and very high, only 13.63 per 
cent report retailers market power to be low and very low. For econometric analysis we 
                                                 
6 For more details on multinomial logit model see Greene
[16]. For an application in the innovation research 
area  see  Cabagnols  and  LeBas,  who  analysed  the  distinguishing  determinants  of    probability  for 
product, process and combined product & process innovations in France
[17].   9 
define a dummy variable (RMP5) which is set equal to 1 for firms reporting a very high 
retailer’s  market  power,  and  is  set  equal  to  zero  otherwise.  The  theoretical  model 
described in section 2 suggests a negative relationship between retailers’ market power 
and  innovation  in  the  upstream  industry.  The  present  study  actually  reveals  a 
statistically significant and negative impact on the probability to innovate with regular 
product  quality,  which  implies  that  retailers’  market  power  impedes  new  product 
introductions. In markets with retailers market power reported to be „very high“ the 
probability to innovate with regular product quality is 83.47%, therewith by 7.19%-
points less than in markets with buyer power reported to be „high“ or less than high.
7 
On  the  probability  to  innovate  with  superior  quality  products  (premium  products), 
however,  buyer  power  does  not  show  a  statistically  significant  impact.  This  result 
implies that oligopsonistic power of the retailers has less impact on the producer of 
premium goods. As quality is a means to differentiate and add identity to the product 
which  appeals  directly  to  the  consumer,  it  gives  some  countervailing  power  to 
manufacturers.  Thus,  the  producer  of  premium  goods  might  resist  the  increasing 
retailers’ market power, margins are not stripped down and, hence give an incentive to 
innovate.  
Is the negative impact of market power in the downstream market on firms’ innovation 
incentive  mitigated  if  manufacturing  firms  also  are  concentrated  and  powerful 
(countervailing power)? According to Neo-Schumpeter-hypothesis II, there is a high 
innovative potential of powerful firms because these firms a) have sufficient financial 
resources  and  accumulation  of  human  capital,  b)  can  realize  economies  of  scale  in 
producing innovations as well as c) have a strong incentive to establish market barriers 
to entry due to product innovation (‘efficiency effect’). Conversely it can be argued that 
firms  with  low  market  power  undertake  innovation  to  withstand  the  pressure  of 
competition and “steal consumers” from competitors. Increasing competitive intensity 
forces to react quickly in order to remain competitive whereas firms with market power 
deter from product innovation since the new product would partially “steal consumers” 
from their own (profitable) old product (‘replacement effect’). Finally, a number of 
authors argue that innovation is discouraged by both, too much or too little competition, 
and occurs when the degree of competition in an industry is in an intermediate range 
[18,19,20,21]. The existing empirical literature reports mixed results. Whereas some authors 
find  a  positive  relationship 
[22,17,23],  others  suggest  a  negative  relationship  between 
different measures of market power and innovative activity 
[24,25,26,27,28]. This study uses 
different  proxies  for  firm’s  market  power.  Table  2  suggests  that  firms with  a  large 
market share (MAS) report a significantly higher innovation incentive for both regular 
and premium product innovation. The parameter estimates of MAS are positive and 
significantly different from zero. A firm with a market share of 10% has compared to a 
firm  with  5%  market  share
8  a  by  3.38%-points  lower  probability  to  innovate  with 
regular product quality (84.72%) but a by 3.87%-points higher probability to launch a 
premium product (15,19%)
9. Results give support to the argument that powerful firms 
                                                 
7 To give evidence on the strength of impact on innovation probabilities   ) ( Pr j QP ob =  elasticities ε were 







j QP ob d
=
=
= ε .  Changes  in  innovation  probabilities  subject  to  changes  in  X  are 
visualized in Appendix 1. 
8 Firm’s market share on the stated scale is in class 3 resp. 4. 
9 Although signs for estimated parameter are positive in both equations, signs of elasticities are different:  
A one per cent increase of MAS lowers the incentive for innovation with regular quality products but 
increases the probability for premium product innovation. This initially uncommon appearing effect 
however is plausible as firms have to decide whether to choose alternative j=0,1 or 2, and the sum of the   10
have a strong incentive to establish market barriers to entry due to product innovation. 
As product quality can be seen as a means to deter market entry
10 the strong effect of 
market share on premium quality innovation is plausible.  
Firms have also been asked to evaluate the “degree of competition” in their primary 
product  market.  Again,  firm’s  response  patterns  are  indicated  from  1  (intensity  of 
competition in industry is very low) to 5 (intensity of competition in industry is very 
high). Including this variable COMP, however, does not contribute to the explanatory 
power  of  the  model.  No  significant  relationship  can  further  be  observed  between  a 
variable  indicating  the  existence  of  predatory  pricing  strategies  or  ‘price  wars’  and 
innovation. Summarizing, there is at least some evidence in favour of the argument that 
firms  with  a  larger  market  share  are  more  likely  to  innovate.  Their  market  power 
restrains the negative effect of retailer market power on innovation incentive, especially 
on the incentive to launch a premium quality product.  
 
Study also looked at the impact of firm size on innovation probability. According to 
Neo-Schumpeter-hypothesis I, it is to emanate from a positive relationship between firm 
size and innovative activity due to better accouterment for introducing new products. 
Large  companies,  it  is  argued,  would  have  an  advantage  in  raising  funds  for  risky 
innovation projects as they can cover capital requirements to a considerable proportion 
from own funds due to higher liquidity and have easier access to loans. Also large firms 
are  able  to  spread  fix  costs  over  a  large  sales  volume,  thus  reduce  unit  costs  of 
production. Innovations would thus be more profitable in big companies. Further, large 
firms can undertake several innovation projects at the time and thereby spread R&D risk 
[29,30,31]. On the other hand it is argued that small enterprises have a higher innovation 
activity  which  might  be  due  to  their  advantage  of  lower  complexity  in  corporate 
structure. Further more small and medium-sized firms produce only such know-how 
they use in short-term 
[31], thus R&D activity is more efficient than in large companies 
[32]. Small firms also have a closer contact to the consumer and are stronger exposed to 
competitive  pressure  than  large  companies,  which  provokes  innovate  behaviour 
[33]. 
Empirical evidence for a negative impact of firm size on innovative behaviour give 
Wittkopp
[28], Acs and Audretsch
[24] and McNamara et al.
[9]. In present study coefficient 
of firm size measured as number of people employed (LABOR) shows a positive sign, 
however, impact is not statistically significant different from zero.  
Table 2 reports a significant and positive impact of company’s share of total sales spent 
on R&D, represented by variable RD. Thus, probabilities to innovate with regular resp. 
premium quality preoducts increases with R&D activity. This result is not surprising as 
R&D can be seen as an investment in innovation. Interviewed companies have reported 
that  R&D  expenditure  is  mainly  utilized  for  developing  new  products  (52.51%  of 
expenses) as well as the joint development of products and processes (31.40%). Also 
empirical literature shows a positive impact of R&D on innovation 
[34,35,23,9]. If a firm 
spends 0,25% of its total sales on R&D and increases this share by 0,25%-points up to 
0,5%
11, the probability to launch a regular quality product decreases by 2.22%-points, 
however the probability for premium product innovation increases increases by 2.55%-
                                                                                                                                               
probabilities for theses j choices is 100%. As  ) 0 ( Pr = QP ob  in the considered area is rather steady, an 
increase of  ) 2 ( Pr = QP ob  comes along with a decline of  ) 1 ( Pr = QP ob .  
10 Van Witteloostuijn and Van Wegberg
[36] argue that product quality innovation is associated with sunk 
costs (e.g. in terms of R&D expenses) which act as market barriers to entry.  
11 This would mean a change of R&D activity on the stated scale from 2 to 3.   11
points  to  13.96%.  Apparently,  particularly  the  development  of  a  superior  quality 
product affords more intense R&D activity
12. 
Moreover, the ability to recognize and react flexible to changes in market condition (e.g. 
consumer needs) is an important requirement for product innovation 
[37,38]. Thus, the 
positive and statistically significant impact of adaptation flexibility (FLEX) reported in 
Table 2 is not astonishing.
13 Compared to firms with medium flexibility those with high 
reported  flexibility  have  a  by  7.46%-points  lower  probability  to  introduce  regular 
quality products into the market (83.12%). The incentive to innovate with premium 
products,  however,  increases  by  8.72%-points  to  16.71%,  therewith  doubles.  As 
demand  for  high-quality  products  increases  with  growing  consumer  income
[6]  firms 
operating flexible have in particular a high incentive to introduce premium products.  
 
Further on, we tested the influence of embarking on brand strategy
14 on the incentive to 
innovate.  Branding  can  be  identified  as  a  means  of  differentiating  products  from 
competitors’ products, which allows for the development of imperfect competition, and 
thereby gives a competitive advantage. Producers with strong brand power may be able 
to  resist  retailers’  increasing  buyer  power
[3],  attain  higher  retail  prices  and  higher 
consumer prices  (double marginalisation).
15 Consequently, branding is associated with 
higher profits provoking innovative behaviour. Therefore, we assume a positive impact 
of  brand  strategy  (BRANDS)  on  innovation  propensity,  which  is  confirmed  by 
regression analysis reported in Table 2. Coefficient of BRANDS is positive, however 
only in the regression of premium quality products impact differs statistically significant 
from zero at the 1%-level. We might argue that both, product quality and a strong brand 
are means for product differentiation so that branding for premium quality products has 
a higher impact on profits than for regular quality products. Consequently,  firms with 
brand strategy have an higher incentive to produce premium quality products than less 
brand strategic firms. Higher propensity is quantifiable: Firms reporting brand strategy 
to be „very important“ have a probability to launch a premium product of 35.01%, 
which is 2,52 times (21.13%-ponits) higher than for firms reporting brand strategy to be 
important (13.88%)
16.  Altogether, changes in the importance of brand strategy have the 
highest impact on the incentive to launch a premium product. 
 
To control for international competition, we included the ratio of exports to firm sales 
(EXQ) in regression. A strong international orientation might allow firms to flee from 
competitive  pressure  on  domestic  markets,  thus  attainable  profit  and  incentive  to 
innovate is higher. However, because of the large (domestic and foreign) sales market 
we  might  argue  that  the  firm  already  attains  satisfiable  profits  with  its  established 
products,  so  that  there  is  no  incentive  to  innovate.  This  might  apply  especially  to 
superior quality products: As the development of new premium products is associated 
with high expenditure (e.g. R&D, investment) and the firm gains high profit margins 
with its existing high quality products, incentive to innovate is low. Following we can 
                                                 
12 E.g. to optimise production process, taste, packaging, convenience attributes. A positive relationship 
between R&D expenses and product quality was also stated by Van Witteloostuijn and Van Wegberg
 
[36]. 
13 Similar results report Cabagnols and LeBas
[17]. 
14 A brand can be defined as "a name, term, sign, symbol, design or a combination of these, which is used 
to identify the goods or services of one seller or group of sellers and to differentiate them from those of 
competitors" 
[39]. 
15  In  this  respect,  Mills  shows  that  own-labels  allow  food  retailers  to  limit  the  extent  of  double 
marginalisation  in  the  food  chain,  and  thus  are  able  to  combat  the  market  power  of  food 
manufacturers
[40].  
16 This would mean a change of BRANDS on the stated scale from 4 to 5.   12
assume  a  negative  impact  of  foreign  activity  on  the  propensity  to  innovate
17,  in 
particular on premium product innovation. This assumption is confirmed by present 
study. The parameter estimate for EXQ in Table 2 is negative and significantly different 
from zero at the 1%-level which implies that firms with high export orientation have a 
lower innovation propensity than firms which mainly focus on domestic markets. To 
illustrate, a firm with an export share of 20% has compared to a firm with 10% export 
share  a  by  2.06%-points  higher  probability  to  introduce  a  regular  quality  product 
(90.09%), but a by 4.01%-points lower probability to do so with premium products 
(7.34%). Seemingly, given high innovation expenditure and already satisfying profits in 
a large sales market, international orientated firms are afraid of innovating with superior 
product quality. 
Theoretical models lead one to expect innovation to be positively related to market size 
and growth. In section 2, market size is represented by P(X). The optimal store quantity 
Q increases with P(X) which again shifts the marginal revenue curve in the second part 
of  Diagram  1  upwards  and  increases  the  optimal  number  of  products  X*.  Our 
expectation of a positive relationship between market size  (SIZE) and innovation is not 
fulfilled in the empirical analysis however. In contrast, the present study underlines 
earlier empirical results on a negative relationship between market size and innovative 
activity
[24,41,9]. In large markets, profits generated from existing products are satisfying 
so  that  firms  don’t  face  the  necessity  to  invest  in  risky  innovation  projects.  Small 
(niche)  markets,  however,  give  an  incentive  to  innovate  as  firms  are  able  to 
differentiate, attain a competitive advantage and thus, generate high profits. In a rather 
large  market  with  20  billion  sales  volume  firms  have  a  by  6.55%-points  higher 
probability to launch a regular quality product (91,29%) than firms in a medium-sized 
market with 10 billion sales volume. However, the probability to launch a premium 
product in the larger market is by 7.4%-points lower than in the smaller market and with 
7.56%  probability  almost  halved.  Apparently,  smaller  (niche)  markets  provide  a 
particular opportunity for premium products. In addition to market size study also tested 
the impact of future market potential on the incentive to innovate. The present study 
uses past industry growth between 1995 and 1999 (GR) as a proxy for future demand 
potentials. It was assumed that in large and growing markets firms have an incentive to 
produce innovative products, as they face a good potential to place their new products. 
This positive relationship is supported by  Schneeweiss
[43] and Zellner
[44]. On the other 
hand, it is argued that especially in stagnant markets or in times of cyclical decline firms 
have a high incentive to innovate in order to prevent imminent economic losses. This 
was  shown  empirically  by  Herrmann  et  al.
[45].  However,  present  study  reveals  no 
significant relationship between market growth and innovation propensities at all.  
 
Finally, we controlled for the influence of the investment rate on innovative behaviour. 
On  the  one  hand  we  can  argue  that  investments  (in  production  lines,  i.e.  process 
innovation) offer possibilities to produce a new product so that a positive relationship 
would be expected. On the other hand we might think that a firm which has had high 
investment expenditure afore concentrates on its existing products rather than investing 
immediately  in  another  risky  new  product  innovation  (which  would  possibly  be 
associated  with  more  investment  expenditure).  Thus,  we  emanate  from  a  negative 
relationship  between  investment  expenses  and  innovation  propensity,  which  is 
supported  empirically  by  present  study.  Present  study  reveals  a  negative  impact  of 
                                                 
17  A  negative  relationship  between  foreign  trade  and  innovation  has  also  been  found  by  Traill  and 
Meulenberg
[42] and Weiss and Wittkopp
[23].   13
investment rate (INVEST)
18 on product innovative behaviour, however only the impact 
on premium innovation is statistically significant different from zero. Apparently, the 
incentive to innovate with premium quality is low if the firm has had high investment 
expenditure afore. An explanation is that the decision to produce a premium product is 
associated with major changes in production process which are associated with high 
future investment expenditure
19, so that the incentive to launch a premium product is 
low. For example, a firms spending 7 per cent of total sales in investment has a by 
1.03%-points lower probability to launch a premium product (10.36% probability) than 
a firm with 6% investment share (11.39%).
 20 
 
Finally, we have to note that most of the marginal effects of exogenous variables resp. 
their elasticities  don’t show statistical significance (exceptions are FLEX, SIZE and 
BRANDS). This might be due to the fact that the probability to launch a regular quality 
product accounts for 87.90% at sample means, thus is very high. Corresponding to this  
probability for premium product innovation is quite small, accounting for 11.60% at 
sample means. Therewith, we are located at the flat tails of a cumulated logit probability 
function.  Here,  a  change  in  exogenous  variables  causes  only  minor  changes  in  the 
probability, so that marginal effects are not statistically significant,  although exogenous 
variables had significant impacts on the propensity to innovate  ij U . Insofar, our results 
are explainable, even though missing statistical significances of marginal effects resp. 
elasticities  are  unsatisfying.  Hence,  estimation  results  should  be  interpreted  with 




Rapidly growing concentration ratios in European food retailing raise concerns about 
the welfare implications for consumers. On the one hand, consumers might gain if lower 
input prices for retailers are passed on to consumers. In the long run, however, retailer 
power might force manufacturers to reduce investment in new products which would 
reduce consumer welfare. The relationship between downstream (retailer) market power 
and upstream (food manufacturing) product innovation is the focus of this paper. On the 
basis of a formal model, we find that retailer market power reduces upstream firms 
incentives to introduce new products. However, we might argue that this impact differs 
between product qualities: Retailers’ market power reduces the incentive for premium 
product innovation less than for regular product quality innovation. This proposition is 
then tested empirically. 
Analysis is based on firm level data from a survey of food manufacturing firms carried 
out in 2002 in Germany. The results of a multinomial logit model give weak support to 
the proposition of a negative effect of retailers’ market power on product innovation 
incentive  in  food  manufacturing.  This  negative  impact  of  market  power  in  the 
downstream market is further mitigated if manufacturing firms also have some market 
power (countervailing power). Premium product innovation is unaffected by retailers’ 
                                                 
18 Note that firms were not asked to specify their investment costs or investment’s aim. Thus, investment 
might mean introducing productive processes for saving resources or producing new products (process 
innovation) but also putting up new buildings. 
19  Shaked  and  Sutton  emphasize  that  increases  in  quality  involve  increases  in  fixed  and/or  variable 
costs
[46]. 
20 In this respect we have to allude to a basic question: Does product innovation afford a new process and 
thus  investment  expenses,  or  does  a  process  innovation  (i.e.  investment)  offer  product  innovation 
possibilities? However, to map the relationship between product and process innovation and possible 
temporary effects in detail, we would need a) more information on investment expenses and b) time 
series data which are not available for present study.   14
market power. This implies that premium product qualities might be a suitable strategy 
to avoid retailers’ oligopsonistic pricing pressure. Further, we find firm’s expenditures 
in R&D and firms flexibility to be significantly and positively related to incentives to 
launch  products  with  regular  resp.  superior  quality.  Brand  strategy  only  effects  the 
incentive for premium product innovation, but impact is distinctive. Moreover, present 
study  reports  a  negative  effect  of  the  firms  international  orientation  and  domestic 
market’s size on innovation incentives. 
 
There has been considerable debate over the appropriate policy treatment towards buyer 
power. As our results are weak and, hence should interpreted with caution, we can not 
underline  the  necessity  to  incorporate  long-run  implications  with  respect  to  product 
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